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Highlights
• The European Central Bank (ECB) has made a number of significant changes to the
original guidelines of its quantitative easing (QE) programme since the programme
started in January 2015. These changes are welcome because the original guidelines
would have rapidly constrained the programme’s implementation.
• The changes announced expand the universe of purchasable assets and give some
flexibility to the ECB in the execution of its programme. However, this might not be
enough to sustain QE throughout 2017, or if the ECB wishes to increase the monthly
amount of purchases in order to provide the necessary monetary stimulus to the euro
area to bring inflation back to 2 percent. To increase the programme’s flexibility, the
ECB could further alter the composition of its purchases.
• The extension of the QE programme also raises some legitimate questions about its
potential adverse consequences. However, the benefits of this policy still outweigh its
possible negative implications for financial stability or for inequality. The fear that the
ECB’s credibility will be undermined because of its QE programme also seems to be
largely unfounded. On the contrary, the primary risk to the ECB’s credibility is the risk
of not reaching its 2 percent inflation target, which could lead to expectations becoming
disanchored.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•  The European Central Bank (ECB) has made a
number of significant changes to the original
design of its quantitative easing (QE)
programme since the programme started in
January 2015. The bank has expanded the list
of national agencies whose securities are
eligible for the Public Sector Purchase
Programme (PSPP); it has changed the issue
share limit (ensuring that the Eurosystem will
not breach the prohibition on monetary financ-
ing), which was originally set at 25 percent, to
33 percent (at least for securities without col-
lective action clauses); it has added regional
and local government bonds to the list of
eligible assets;  it has announced that the
programme would continue past September
2016, the previously-announced minimum
end-date, to March 2017 “or beyond, if neces-
sary”; and it has declared its intention to
reinvest the principal payments on the securi-
ties purchased under the programme as
they mature. 
•  As explained in Claeys et al (2015b), the pro-
gramme’s original guidelines would have
constrained the size and duration of the pro-
gramme, especially if it was sustained through-
out 2017. The changes to the design of the
programme announced during 2015 greatly
expand the universe of purchasable assets and
should therefore delay the point at which limits
will be reached. However, the decision to
reinvest the principal payments as bonds
mature, by increasing the monthly monetary
purchase after March 2017, would also lead to
the limits being reached sooner. In the same
way, a decision by the ECB to increase the
amount of PSPP purchases each month, for
instance from €44 billion to €64 billion, would
also frontload the purchases. In the end,
because of the issue share limit, for a given set
of securities there will always be a trade-off
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between larger monthly purchases and a
prolonged programme.
• Further changes to the design of the pro-
gramme will have to be implemented in order
to increase the duration of the programme if the
limit is binding in a major country before infla-
tion is on the path towards 2 percent. These
could include waiving the issue limit for AAA-
rated bonds, or purchasing senior uncovered
bank bonds as well corporate bonds. A more
radical change could be to move away from an
allocation of asset purchases between coun-
tries based on the ECB capital keys to an allo-
cation based on the actual size of their
outstanding debt.
• We also discuss the possible financial stability
risks of a prolonged and large-scale QE
programme, and conclude that the benefits of
large-scale asset purchases outweigh their
potential risks in terms of financial stability.
However, micro- and macro-prudential policies
should be used forcefully to prevent such risks
from materialising. 
• We also consider the potential effects that a
prolonged asset-purchase programme could
have on inequality. The increase in inequality
observed in many advanced countries in
recent decades is a long-term trend and prima-
rily the result of deep structural changes. Our
view is that the primary mandate of the ECB is
to maintain price stability, and considerations
of inequality are not within its purview, unless
inequality prevents the transmission of mone-
tary policy in some way. The ECB should there-
fore focus on fulfilling its price stability
mandate by supporting the fragile recovery
now taking place in the euro area. This is the
best way for monetary policy to contribute to
the avoidance of an increase in inequality. 
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1. Draghi (2016) hinted at
further easing during the
press conference following
the Governing Council of
January 2016.
2. See for instance
Baumeister and Benati
(2010) or Kapetanios
et al (2012).
• The fear that the ECB will lose its credibility
solely because it is currently buying a large
amount of sovereign bonds appears to be
largely unfounded. The primary risk to the
ECB’s credibility is the risk of not reaching its
inflation target. In our view, the ECB should
therefore try to find the right balance between
the risk of breaching the monetary financing
prohibition and the risk of not fulfilling its man-
date because of the limits imposed on its own
QE programme.
1. INTRODUCTION
On 22 January 2015, the European Central Bank
(ECB) introduced the Public Sector Purchase Pro-
gramme (PSPP). Under the PSPP, the Eurosystem
started in March 2015 to buy sovereign bonds
from euro-area governments and securities from
European institutions and national agencies. 
On 3 December 2015, ECB president Mario Draghi
announced an extension of the programme. While
it was initially foreseen to last until at least
September 2016, it was extended until at least
March 2017. Additionally, regional and local gov-
ernment bonds were added to the list of eligible
assets for purchase, and the interest rate on the
deposit facility was lowered from -0.2 percent to -
0.3 percent.
President Draghi said that the asset purchase pro-
gramme would continue “until we see a sustained
convergence towards our objective of a rate of
inflation which is below but close to 2 percent”
(Draghi 2015c). This goal remains far from being
fulfilled: euro-area year-on-year headline inflation
has been below 2 percent since January 2013,
below 1 percent since November 2013, and was
still at 0.2 percent in December 2015, while core
inflation was only at 0.9 percent. In the meantime,
and most importantly, both medium- and long-
term market-based expectations and inflation
forecasts have started to fall again (Figure 1). As
both measures suggest, after a clear decline until
the end of 2014, inflation expectations rebounded
significantly after QE was announced in January
2015 and during the whole first half of 2015. How-
ever, expectations recently fell back to previous
lows, heavily influenced by the steep decline in
oil prices, as explained in Darvas and Hüttl (2016).
For these reasons and because inflation appears
likely to substantially undershoot the ECB’s staff
forecast over the next two years, it is probable1
that the ECB will enhance its programme further in
order to fulfil its mandate and bring inflation back
towards 2 percent in the medium term. Even if the
impact of asset purchase programmes is more dif-
ficult to measure than that of more conventional
monetary measures, a growing literature2 con-
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Figure 1: market-based and survey-based inﬂation expectations in the euro area
Sources: Thomson Reuters Eikon (left panel) and ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (2016) (right panel). Note: HICP =
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices.
Five-year ﬁve-year forward inﬂation-linked swap (%)                    Five-year ahead HICp probability distribution (%) 
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cludes that QE programmes implemented around
the world boosted inflation, output and employ-
ment.
For the euro area in particular, the effects of QE are
even more difficult to pin down given that the pro-
gramme only started in March 2015. However,
there are already some indications that QE is
having some impact on the euro-area economy.
The effects on the exchange rate and on interest
rates (and in particular on financial fragmentation
in the euro area, with credit rates converging
again) have been the most visible. In terms of
inflation, monetary measures take time to materi-
alise in prices and it is very difficult to know what
can be attributed exactly to QE, but, for instance,
the basket share of the consumer price index in
deflation declined from 40 percent at the begin-
ning of 2015 to 25 percent at the start of 2016.
Darvas (2016) also shows that core inflation
adjusted for second-round effects of energy prices
went up over 2015 and, after reaching a low point
in Q1 2015 of around 0.7 percent, it is now at 1.2
percent, a level unseen since 2011.
However desirable they might be, the recent – and
maybe future – extensions of the asset purchase
programme raise questions about how its size and
its duration can be materially increased given the
finite volume of purchasable debt securities. In
fact, the universe of purchasable debt securities
needs to be expanded because of the ECB’s self-
imposed limit on the proportion it can hold of a
given debt issue (decided at the launch of the pro-
gramme) and not so much because of the scarcity
of debt securities.
Claeys et al (2015b) showed already at the
launch of the PSPP that without any changes to
the design of the programme this limit could be
reached in March 2017 or before in a number of
countries. For Germany, calculations in Claeys et
al (2015b) suggested that the limit would be
reached in April 2017. Given the structure of the
programme using the ECB capital keys to deter-
mine the distribution of purchases between coun-
tries, this could have seriously limited its
effectiveness.
Since then, the issue share limit was raised in Sep-
tember 2015, and the changes to the programme
in December 2015 further expanded the universe
of eligible debt that can be purchased by the
Eurosystem. However, these expansions might
still not be enough to prevent the limits being
reached before the inflation target is achieved.
Furthermore, the unconventional and previously
untested nature of such a programme poses legit-
imate questions regarding the potential adverse
consequences that such a substantial and pro-
longed programme could have. 
In section 2 we explain the changes to the design
of the purchase programme during its first year of
implementation, and their implications for our cal-
culations on when the limits will be reached, also
envisaging a scenario in which the monthly
amounts purchased under the PSPP would be
increased. We then discuss potential risks that
accompany a lengthy and massive asset-pur-
chase programme in terms of inequality, financial
stability and the central bank’s credibility. 
2. POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION LIMITS OF THE
ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMME
2.1 The extended asset purchase programme’s
original guidelines
On 22 January 2015 the ECB announced a
massive expansion of its asset purchase pro-
gramme. To supplement the Asset-Backed Secu-
rities and Covered Bonds Purchase Programmes
(ABSPP and CBPP3) launched in September 2014,
the ECB introduced a new Public Sector Purchase
Programme (PSPP) to buy sovereign bonds from
euro-area governments and securities from Euro-
pean supranational institutions and national
agencies. While total monthly purchases of asset-
backed securities and covered bonds had previ-
ously amounted to approximatively €10 billion
per month, the new purchases of sovereign
bonds, supranational institutions, and agencies
raised the figure to €60 billion per month, €44
billion of which was dedicated to purchases of
government and national agency bonds (and this
€44 billion was divided between euro-area
countries according to each country’s capital
subscription at the ECB). The purchases started
on 9 March 2015 and were originally meant to last
at least until September 2016. The ECB’s Govern-
ing Council also made it clear at the time that the
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programme was open-ended and that purchases
would be conducted until the ECB would see “a
sustained adjustment in the path of inflation
which is consistent with the aim of achieving infla-
tion rates below, but close to, 2 percent”.
On top of the eligibility criteria (ie only debt secu-
rities with a remaining maturity between 2 and 30
years and with a yield above the deposit rate can
be bought), the ECB’s Governing Council also
decided to put in place a 25 percent issue limit
and a 33 percent issuer limit on Eurosystem hold-
ings. The 25 percent issue limit was imposed to
prevent the ECB from having “a blocking minority
Table 1: List of national agencies whose securities are eligible for purchase
agency Country
Caisse d'amortissement de la dette sociale (CADES) France
11Union Nationale Interprofessionnelle pour l'Emploi dans l'Industrie et le Com-
merce (UNEDIC)
France
Instituto de Credito Oﬁcial Spain
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Germany
Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg Foerderbank Germany
Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank Germany
NRW.Bank Germany
Bpifrance Financement SA France
ACOSS France
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) France
Agence Française de Développement (AFD) France
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti S.p.A. Italy
Finnvera Oyj Finland
Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten N.V. (BNG) Netherlands
Nederlandse Waterschapsbank N.V. (NWB) Netherlands
Nederlandse Financieringsmaatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (FMO) Netherlands
SID - Slovenska izvozna in razvojna banka, d.d. Slovenia
Työttömyysvakuutusrahasto (TVR) Finland
ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG Austria
Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG (ASFINAG) Austria
Infraestruturas de Portugal S.A. (IP) Portugal
ENMC - Entidade Nacional para o Mercado de Combustíveis E.P.E Portugal
Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane S.p.A. Italy
Terna S.p.A. - Rete Elettrica Nazionale Italy
ENEL S.p.A. Italy
SNAM S.p.A. Italy
Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias – Alta Velocidad (Adif AV) Spain
SNCF Réseau France
Caisse Nationale des Autoroutes (CNA) France
DARS d.d. Slovenia
Source: Bruegel. Note: Agencies which became eligible after the start of the Public Sector Purchase Programme in March 2015 are noted
in red.
3. A more extensive
description of the initial
programme, of its rules and
composition of the
purchases, can be found in
Claeys et al (2015b).
4. Draghi (2015b).
5. Draghi (2015c)
6. When the ECB adds a
bond with a yield above the
deposit rate on the asset
side of its balance sheet, it
should make a profit out of
it (at least as long as the
deposit rate is not
increased) even if this yield
is negative, because it
creates some reserves on
its liability side that are
remunerated at the deposit
rate by the banks. 
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securities not containing collective action clauses
(CACs). This change to the maximum amount that
the Eurosystem can hold of a particular issue
allows the PSPP to potentially continue for longer
than was originally possible under the previous
rules.
In December 20155, the Governing Council
announced many new changes to the design of
the PSPP. First, it decided to reduce the deposit
rate from -0.2 percent to -0.3 percent. Since the
Eurosystem decided to purchase bonds with
yields above the deposit rate in order to avoid
making a direct loss on the purchases6, the cut-
ting of the deposit rate effectively increased the
amount of debt securities eligible for purchase
(even if the rate cut also reduced yields and there-
fore limited the volume increase). Second, the ECB
decided to continue the PSPP past the previously-
announced minimum end-date, September 2016,
until March 2017, “or beyond, if necessary”. Third,
euro-denominated debt issued by regional and
local euro-area governments became eligible for
purchase. Finally, the ECB declared its intention
to reinvest the principal payments on the securi-
ties purchased under the programme as they
mature, for as long as necessary. This effectively
implies that in March 2017, two years after the
start of the programme, when the first bonds
bought by the Eurosystem will start to mature,
monthly purchases of sovereign and agency
bonds could exceed €44 billion, as the principals
of these maturing bonds will be reinvested.
in a debt restructuring involving collective action
clauses”. This indicated that the ECB did not wish
to be in a position in which it had the power to
block a potential vote on the restructuring of ECB-
held debt of a euro-area country, because not
blocking such a restructuring would be interpreted
as monetary financing of a member state3.
2.2 Changes to the ECB’s guidelines since March
2015
The ECB’s rules on the Public Sector Purchase Pro-
gramme (PSPP) have gradually been adapted
since the programme started in March 2015. As
highlighted in Claeys et al (2015b), the original
rules rapidly constrained the purchases in coun-
tries in which public debt was small and in which
no national agencies were identified as eligible for
purchases. The aim of most of the changes was
therefore to expand the universe of available debt
securities that the Eurosystem could purchase, in
order to delay the point at which the programme
would reach its limits in each euro-area country.
In July 2015, the ECB expanded the list of national
agencies whose securities are eligible for pur-
chase under the PSPP (see Table 1), thereby allow-
ing the Eurosystem to purchase debt securities in
countries where the limits had already been
reached, or were expected to be reached soon.
In September 20154, the issue share limit was
increased from 25 percent to 33 percent for debt
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Figure 2: projection of monthly purchases (€ billion)  per country with original rules (excluding
national agencies) from Claeys et al (2015b)
Sources: Bruegel based on ECB, NCBS, National Treasuries, Datastream. Note: Luxembourg, Lithuania and Estonia do not
appear on this chart given the very small amount of debt securities of these countries in the market.
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7. The assumptions and
method used can be found
in the annex to Claeys et al
(2015b).
8. Note that we do not
include here the purchases
of supranational bonds,
which are also part of the
PSPP and represent €6bn
per month. Our previous
projections of when the
limits would be reached for
supranational institutions
can be found in Claeys et al
(2015b). They should be
unchanged as long as these
institutions’ debt securities
contain collective action
clauses. However, we were
not able to retrieve any infor-
mation about this. In cases
in which bonds do not
contain CACs, the limit would
be moved to 33 percent
instead of 25 percent, which
would extend the purchase
limit from the end of 2016 to
mid-2017.
9. ESM Treaty Article 12
Paragraph 3.
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Figure 3: projection of monthly purchases (€ billion) per country, including national agencies
(scenario 1: all debt securities contain CaCs)
Source: Bruegel based on ECB, NCBs, National Treasuries, Thomson Reuters. Note: Purchases before January 2016
match the actual purchases made by the Eurosystem (which can be found here https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/
implement/omt/html/index.en.html), while they are our projections from February 2016.
2.3 Limits of the programme in terms of size,
duration and composition
Claeys et al (2015b), published at the time of the
start of the purchases, calculated when the ECB’s
limits would be reached in each euro-area country
(Figure 2). In this section we update these calcu-
lations7 in light of the changes to the rules. We
also include national agencies in our calcula-
tions8.
Before September 2015 the issue limit was 25
percent regardless of the type of bond. Now, how-
ever, this limit is 33 percent if the issue does not
contain a collective action clause. Unfortunately,
information on whether an issue contains a CAC is
not readily available. We know, however, that
according to the ESM Treaty9, all euro-area gov-
ernment debt securities with maturity over one
year issued after 1 January 2013 contain CACs.
Therefore, we envisaged two extreme scenarios:
in the first scenario, we assume that all eligible
debt securities, be they from agencies, local gov-
ernments, or central governments, have CACs, in
which case the Eurosystem can only hold a max-
imum of 25 percent of a country’s eligible debt
securities. In the second scenario, we assume
that the only debt securities to have CACs are
those issued by central governments after 1 Jan-
uary 2013 (in this scenario, the Eurosystem can
hold 25 percent of each issue containing CACs,
and 33 percent of each issue which does not).
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Figure 4: projection of monthly purchases (€ billion) per country, including national agencies
(scenario 2: only central government debt issued after the 1st of January 2013 contains CaCs)
Source: Bruegel based on ECB, NCBs, National Treasuries, Thomson Reuters. Note: Purchases before January 2016
match the actual purchases made by the Eurosystem (which can be found here https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/
implement/omt/html/index.en.html), while they are our projections from February 2016.
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a few million euros, while, were the programme to
go on until then, they will be worth roughly €1.5
billion per month in March 2019, which is sizeable
because it would increase the monthly purchases
of German bonds by approximately 10 percent.
This effectively means that, while the limits will be
reached at roughly the same time as before the
rules changed, the balance sheet of the Eurosys-
tem will be bigger at that time thanks to the
increase in eligible debt.
Figure 4 shows our projections for the second sce-
nario, in which only central government debt secu-
rities issued after 1 January 2013 are assumed to
contain CACs. The limits will be reached later than
in scenario 1, as can be seen easily by comparing
figures 2 and 3. For example, while in scenario 1,
purchases in Germany are heavily constrained
Reality will lie between these two extremes.
Figure 3 shows our projections for the monthly
purchases, by country, in the scenario in which
every debt security contains a CAC. Despite the
increase in eligible debt (with the expanded list of
agencies, and the new ability to buy regional and
local debt), the limits are reached roughly at the
same time as in Figure 2, and even earlier in some
cases. This is because of the reinvestment of prin-
cipals, which kicks in in March 2017: it effectively
raises the amounts purchased each month, and
increases the speed at which the limits are
reached. In fact, while redemptions of PSPP hold-
ings will be small at first, they would accelerate
quickly as more and more debt securities held by
the Eurosystem mature. In Germany, for instance,
the holdings maturing in March 2017 will be worth
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Figure 5: projection of monthly purchases (€ billion) per country, including national agencies, if
amount purchased is increased to €64 billion (scenario 1: all debt securities contain CaCs)
Source: Bruegel based on ECB, NCBs, National Treasuries, Thomson Reuters. Note: see note to Figure 3.
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Figure 6: projection of monthly purchases (€ billion) per country, including national agencies, if
amount purchased is increased to €64 billion (scenario 2: only central government debt issued
after 1 January 2013 contains CaCs)
Source: Bruegel based on ECB, NCBs, National Treasuries, Thomson Reuters. Note: see note to Figure 3.
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10. Data available at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/p
aym/coll/charts/html/index.
en.html.
after April 2017, this is not the case until March
2018 in scenario 2.
On 21 January 2016, President Draghi hinted at
further easing, given “downside risks” related to
heightened uncertainty about the growth
prospects of emerging economies, volatility in
financial and commodity markets, and geopoliti-
cal risks. While this further easing could come in
the form of a further reduction in the deposit rate,
which would increase the amount of debt eligible
for purchase (provided that the yields on these
securities do not fall excessively in the mean-
time), the Governing Council might also decide to
increase the amounts purchased each month
under the PSPP. The Eurosystem is currently
purchasing €44 billion of agency and government
debt per month, but this could be raised. In Figures
5 and 6 we show our projections of monthly pur-
chases were the amounts purchased each month
to increase from €44 billion to €64 billion in March
2016, in both scenarios. As is apparent, the limits
in each country would be reached much more
quickly. Under the more restrictive scenario 1, the
limit in Germany, the country in which purchases
are the highest, would be reached as soon as
November 2016. An increase in monthly pur-
chases might be desirable to provide immediately
a more accommodative stance to the euro area’s
monetary policy in order to reach the inflation
target, but it might not be compatible with a longer
duration of the programme if the rest of the pro-
gramme design remains unchanged.
2.4 What could be done to further extend the
duration of the programme if necessary?
Claeys et al (2015b) already recommended that
the ECB increase the 25 percent issue limit to
address the constraint that it would place on the
size and duration of the PSPP. Claeys et al (2015b)
also recommended that the list of eligible agen-
cies be broadened. These changes have been put
in place since March 2015, but that might not be
enough to increase the pool of eligible assets. That
is why Claeys et al (2015b) also recommended
waiving entirely the issue limit, at least for AAA-
rated bonds. This would allow, for instance, longer
purchases of German sovereign bonds or Euro-
pean Investment Bank bonds.
The composition of the purchases could also be
further altered. As already discussed at length in
Claeys et al (2014), there are other types of
assets that the Eurosystem could purchase if the
ECB QE programme needs to be enhanced to bring
inflation back to target. This could lengthen the
duration of asset purchases, and increase the
monthly monetary stimulus.
The Eurosystem could purchase senior well-rated
uncovered bank bonds. While they are riskier
than the covered bank bonds which are already
being purchased under the CBPP3, the compre-
hensive assessment carried out by the ECB and
national supervisors in 2014 and 2015 should
theoretically ensure that euro-area banks are ade-
quately capitalised and can smoothly absorb
financial shocks. According to the ECB, there is
currently more than €2 trillion of uncovered bank
bonds which are eligible as ECB collateral10 (the
Eurosystem collateral eligibility framework is not
exactly similar but is roughly comparable to
the eligibility criteria of assets for purchase,
except for instance in terms of accepted maturity
and minimum yield).
Another possibility would be for the Eurosystem
to purchase corporate bonds, of which there are
almost €1.5 trillion eligible for collateral purposes
(although part of these are not euro-denominated,
or are issued by corporates outside the euro area,
in which case they should not be eligible).
Purchases of these securities might have differ-
ent, or even complementary, effects, as explained
in Claeys et al (2014). However, they could help
the Eurosystem provide a stronger monetary
accommodation for a longer period, and delay wor-
ries that the QE programme would reach its limits
before the path of inflation is consistent with the
inflation target.
Finally, the ECB Governing Council could also
decide to change the way purchases are spread
across euro-area countries, in order to shift some
of the purchases from countries in which the limit
will be binding (eg in Germany by the Bundes-
bank) to other national central banks. The first
major country in which the limits will be reached is
Germany, because the amounts purchased in
each country are proportional to the country’s cap-
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ital subscription to the Eurosystem, of which Ger-
many is the largest, while there is proportionally
much less outstanding debt in Germany than in
Italy, for example. Distributing the purchases
across countries according to their outstanding
debt instead of distributing them according to the
ECB capital keys would lead to limits being
reached in every country at roughly the same
time11. Given the various channels through which
asset purchases can influence monetary condi-
tions and thereby economic activity and prices,
changing the country distribution of purchases
could alter the effects of QE in the euro area12,
which should be carefully taken into considera-
tion by the Governing Council, were it to take this
decision.
3.  POTENTIAL RISKS RELATED TO UNCONVENTIONAL
MONETARY POLICY
The unconventional and previously untested
nature of these policies poses some legitimate
questions regarding their potential adverse con-
sequences for financial stability, inequality and in
terms of the credibility of the ECB.
3.1 Risks for financial stability13 
The ECB’s asset purchase programme, combined
with the other unconventional monetary meas-
ures implemented since 2008 to avoid a full-scale
liquidity crisis in the banking sector and the break-
up of the euro area, contributes to an accom-
modative monetary policy stance. Cuts to the
central bank rates to close to or even below zero,
large-scale asset purchases, long-maturity lend-
ing to banks and forward guidance lead to loose
monetary conditions that should stimulate growth
and bring inflation back towards the 2 percent
target. By increasing inflation and output (and
therefore public debt sustainability), these meas-
ures should benefit financial stability. However,
prolonged accommodative monetary policies
could also pose some challenges to financial insti-
11. In this case the propor-
tion of debt containing CACs
would determine when the
limit will be reached in each
country, but the timing of the
limits in each country will
nevertheless be more
synchronised.
12. The signalling, portfolio
rebalancing, exchange rate
and wealth effect channels
could be unaltered by such a
decision (depending also on
who is selling the securities
to the ECB), while the yield
differential could be com-
pressed further and there-
fore have a different effect
than in the case with a distri-
bution based on capital
keys. It is difficult to know
which effects would domi-
nate. See Claeys et al
(2014) for details on how
these theoretical channels
operate.
13. This section sum-
marises the more in-depth
analysis, findings and rec-
ommendations of Claeys
and Darvas (2015).
14. See details and graphs
in Claeys and Darvas
(2015).
15. In the euro area,
German, Austrian and
Lithuanian life insurers are
the most exposed to this
risk. See Claeys and Darvas
(2015) for the data on each
country
16. Draghi (2016): “it’s not
exactly a mandate to protect
banks’ profitability, or for
this matter insurance com-
panies’ profitability. But of
course we are aware of the
consequences of this, and
the best answer to these
concerns is to make sure
that the overall economy
returns to growth, to sustain-
able growth, with price sta-
bility, and that's the best
answer for the stability of
the financial and the bank-
ing sector as well”.
tutions and might have adverse consequences
through various channels for financial stability.
One of the purposes of monetary policy is to sup-
port the economy by encouraging more risk-taking
at a time when risk-taking in the financial system
is less than socially desirable. However, if risk-
taking becomes excessive and goes beyond what
is socially desirable, it might contribute to future
financial instability. It is very difficult to say when
risk-taking becomes excessive, but as discussed
in Claeys and Darvas (2015), banking indicators
do not suggest substantially-increased risk-taking
over the last six years and show on the contrary a
clear tightening of credit standards in the euro
area, while bank leverage has declined signifi-
cantly, which should reduce the risks to financial
stability. Bank regulation, stricter supervision and
market pressure might have played an important
role in limiting financial-sector leverage.
Increases in asset prices disconnected from
fundamentals are also often mentioned as a
potential side effect of QE programmes. However,
while it is true that stock-market indices have been
trending higher throughout the world over the last
few years, simple equity valuation indicators
do not suggest any obvious bubbles. The same
appears to be true for housing prices in the
euro area14.
QE programmes are also accused of threatening
financial stability by reducing the profitability of
financial institutions. For instance, some life insur-
ance companies in the euro area have liabilities
with longer maturities than their assets and are
thereby exposed to a decline in interest rates
given the guaranteed returns they promise to
clients15. But it also appears that non-life insur-
ance activities are expected to perform well in the
coming years, which might compensate for the
declining profitability of life insurance, which is
often provided by the same companies. Moreover,
as argued by President Draghi in January 201616,
‘ The unconventional and previously untested nature of these policies poses some legitimate
questions regarding their potential adverse consequences for financial stability, inequality and
in terms of the credibility of the ECB.’
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even if the ECB monitors the impact of its low rate
policy on financial stability, the ECB’s mandate is
not per se to ensure the profitability of any partic-
ular financial institution, especially if the decline
in profitability of this institution arises from an
unsustainable business model based on a pecu-
liar maturity mismatch17.
Should monetary policy target financial stability
explicitly? The global financial crisis has demon-
strated that price stability in itself is not sufficient
to ensure financial stability. Bubbles and boom-
bust credit cycles emerged and eventually led to
very high costs in terms of reduced output and
unemployment in several advanced countries. A
broad consensus has emerged that financial
stability issues should be addressed ex ante.
However, there is no consensus on the role of
monetary policy in supporting financial stability.
In our view, monetary policy tools are not well
suited to tame financial excesses when the finan-
cial cycle deviates from the economic cycle or
when financial cycles in euro-area countries differ.
Monetary policy should focus on its primary man-
date of area-wide price stability. Micro-prudential
supervision, macro-prudential supervision, fiscal
policy and regulation are the keys to mitigating
financial stability risks. It is still too early to judge
the effectiveness of the new European frame-
works for micro- and macro-prudential supervi-
sion. The literature assessing these tools in other
jurisdictions has produced some encouraging
results, but the complex European set-up could
make their implementation less effective.
Overall, as assessed by Claeys and Darvas
(2015), the benefits of unconventional monetary
policy measures including large-scale asset pur-
chases seem to outweigh their potential risks to
financial stability. The ECB should nevertheless be
vigilant and be aware of the potential financial sta-
bility consequences of its monetary policy
actions. Prudential policies, to which the ECB will
now contribute via the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism and the European Systemic Risk Board,
should be implemented forcefully in order to
create a first line of defence in addressing finan-
cial stability concerns and avoiding the build-up
of financial imbalances in the euro area.
3.2 Distributional effects of QE18 
The increase in income and wealth inequality
observed in many advanced countries in recent
decades is a long-term trend and primarily the
result of deep structural changes, including skill-
biased technological change, globalisation, demo-
graphics, institutional and political changes and,
in particular, changes to fiscal, educational and
labour institutions. Nevertheless, there are some
concerns that QE programmes could amplify this
trend, at least in the short and medium terms.
Through increases in financial asset prices, cen-
tral bank asset purchases could increase inequal-
ity between the wealthy and poor, between the
young and old, and also between regions when
they have different financial structures. Increases
in the value of assets such as equities and gov-
ernment and corporate bonds will tend to favour
the rich who have greater holding of them, as illus-
trated in Claeys et al (2015a) using the ECB's
Household Finance and Consumption Survey
(2013). Because older people tend to have higher
savings and might sell them in the future in order
to maintain their consumption, while younger
households will usually buy these assets in the
future in order to save for retirement, QE pro-
grammes might have distributional consequences
across generations. QE can also benefit house-
holds differently depending on the structure of
their financial assets, since certain households
could make better use of the opportunity offered
by low-interest rate borrowing than others.
However, QE programmes could also reduce
inequality through an increase in (or at least a sta-
bilising effect on) housing prices and a fall in inter-
est rates. Housing is the main asset of the middle
class19 and therefore house price increases will
tend to compress the wealth distribution. Falls in
mortgage interest rates also tend to benefit people
with lower incomes who spend a greater share of
their income on servicing their debts.
Likewise, the stimulative effects that unconven-
tional monetary policy has on the economy tends
to reduce inequality. The empirical literature sug-
gests that asset purchase programmes tend to
boost inflation, output and employment. In the
17. In theory (for instance
in Diamond and Dybvig,
1983), the main role of
financial institutions is to
transform short-term liabili-
ties into long-term assets in
order to provide to deposi-
tors liquidity services and at
the same time ensure them
of the best return as possi-
ble. Banks are generally
characterised by this matu-
rity mismatch. Life insur-
ances, with longer-term
liabilities, do not have to pro-
vide a liquidity service to
their creditors (or at least not
as much as banks) and
should therefore not be char-
acterised by a maturity mis-
match and should be able to
invest almost entirely their
liabilities in long-term
assets. What we observe in
some euro-area countries is
the opposite mismatch in
which assets are shorter-
term than liabilities, which in
theory is not optimal
because it could be done at
the individual level without
resorting to a financial
intermediary.
18. This section
summarises the in-depth
analysis, findings and
recommendations of Claeys
et al (2015a).
19. See the various graphs
illustrating these points in
Claeys et al (2015a)
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absence of these policies, unemployment would
thus be higher, which would lead to higher income
inequality because the poor and low-skilled are
the most likely to lose their jobs in recessions and
because wages are the primary source of revenue
for poorer and lower-income people.
The ECB’s primary mandate is to maintain price
stability, and considerations of inequality are not
within its purview, unless inequality prevents the
transmission of monetary policy in some way. The
ECB should therefore focus on its price stability
mandate by supporting the fragile recovery now
taking place in the euro area. This is the best way
for monetary policy to contribute to the avoidance
of an increase in inequality.
Another important policy question is how to tackle
inequality in general, and whether governments
should design special measures in a deep reces-
sion or in a situation in which central bank actions
increase inequality. For example, in the United
States, policies such as the Home Affordable Refi-
nance Programme, which helped homeowners
with negative home equity to refinance their mort-
gages, might have helped dampen the rising
inequality that resulted from the housing slump.
Fiscal and social policies are the right tools to fight
inequality. As documented by Darvas and Wolff
(2014), there are huge differences in the effi-
ciency of social redistribution systems in EU coun-
tries. For their levels of social expenditure and
personal income taxes, several southern Euro-
pean countries and Belgium achieve a much
smaller reduction in inequality than other EU
countries. Revising national tax/benefit systems
for improved efficiency, intergenerational equity
and fair burden-sharing between the wealthy and
the poor is the right way to fight inequality.
3.3 Credibility risks for the ECB
The primary mandate of the ECB is to ensure price
stability in the euro area, and the ECB’s credibility
is based on fulfilling this mandate. If inflation devi-
ates significantly from “below but close to 2 per-
cent” for a prolonged period of time, expectations
might start to deviate as well, and companies and
households might start making decisions con-
cerning wages and prices with a different inflation
anchor in mind, which could be very dangerous
given the self-fulfilling nature of inflation expec-
tations. Since the beginning of 2013, inflation has
been trending well below its target and expecta-
tions have started drifting downwards as a result.
The ECB has thus not been fulfilling its mandate
and is therefore at risk of losing its credibility.
On the contrary, the fear that the ECB will lose its
credibility because of the significant amount of
sovereign bonds it is currently buying appears to
be unfounded for several reasons. First, it is true
that if inflation was running well above the 2
percent target and that the ECB was buying sov-
ereign bonds with the sole objective of easing
financing conditions on government debts
despite the fact that it could drive inflation further
above the target, then the ECB could easily lose
credibility and put itself in a very dangerous situ-
ation. However, the current situation is the oppo-
site. Inflation is currently very low and the ECB
needs to avoid at all costs that the inflation expec-
tations of euro-area citizens and companies
become disanchored. Without the option of easing
monetary conditions further through rate cuts, the
ECB had to resort to QE, like every other major cen-
tral bank, in order to provide the necessary
accommodation to fulfil its mandate.
Second, since the launch of the PSPP, the ECB
Governing Council has been very careful to avoid
breaching the prohibition of monetary financing
included in the EU Treaty. The 25 percent issue
limit for bonds containing CACs is there to prevent
the ECB from having “a blocking minority in a debt
restructuring involving collective action clauses”
(ECB, 2015). This clearly indicates that the ECB
does not want to be in a position in which it would
‘ The ECB should focus on its price stability mandate by supporting the fragile recovery now
taking place in the euro area. This is the best way for monetary policy to contribute to the
avoidance of an increase in inequality.’
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have the power to block a potential vote on the
restructuring of the ECB-held debt of a euro-area
country, because not blocking such a restructur-
ing could be interpreted as monetary financing of
a member state. On the contrary, if a majority of
creditors with collective action clauses would
accept a restructuring of some bonds, the ECB
could do nothing against such a restructuring and
would have to accept it. Because it would not be
voluntary, it would not be considered as mone-
tary financing and would therefore not be in
contradiction with the EU Treaty.
In our view, the problem is that the ECB has been
so careful to avoid the possibility of monetary
financing ex ante that it has put the operational
implementation of its QE programme at risk by
constraining it too much, as detailed in section 2.
The ECB should instead try to balance both the
risk of breaching the monetary financing prohibi-
tion and the risk of not fulfilling its mandate
because of the limits imposed on its own QE
programme. For instance, the risk of monetary
financing of an AAA-rated government such as
Germany’s appears to be currently negligible and
should not act as a constraint on the full
implementation of the programme and the
achievement of the ECB’s mandate. We therefore
renew our recommendation to the ECB to waive
the 25 percent limit, at least for well-rated
countries, in order to facilitate the implementation
of its QE programme.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The sovereign quantitative easing programme
of the ECB finally started in 2015. This decision
was welcome given the clear downward trend
in inflation and the feeble recovery of the euro
area in the last few years.
Nevertheless, in a monetary union such as the
euro area, with multiple sovereign debt securities,
the execution of such a programme is very com-
plex. The ECB Governing Council imposed limits to
ensure ex ante that the ECB would not breach the
prohibition of monetary financing. However, our
updated calculations show that these limits will
constrain the duration and size of the programme
throughout 2017, even when taking into account
the changes announced throughout 2015, and
especially if the ECB decides to increase its
monthly purchases. We recommend that the ECB
further alter the programme guidelines. Changes
could include the purchase of corporate bonds as
well as senior well-rated uncovered bank bonds.
A more radical change would be to move away
from an allocation of asset purchases between
countries based on the ECB capital keys, to an
allocation based on the actual size of countries’
outstanding debts.
Additionally, the extension of the QE programme
raises some legitimate questions on its potential
adverse consequences. In our assessment, the
benefits outweigh the potential negative implica-
tions, for instance for financial stability or for
inequality. Central banks should of course be
aware of the potential side effects of their actions
(which are generally temporary), but issues of
financial stability and inequality are mainly the
result of deep structural changes, and therefore
other policies remain essential to deal with them.
Micro and macro-prudential policies should con-
stitute the first line of defence to avoid the build-
up of financial imbalances, while fiscal and social
policies are the right tools to fight the current rise
in inequality in advanced countries.
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